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Mobile Signs and Immutable Mobiles: Bergson and Latour  
In a discussion of the intellect in his 1911 work Creative Evolution, Henri 
Bergson refers fleetingly to mobility and semiosis: 
There must be a language whose signs – which cannot be infinite in 
number – are extensible to an infinity of things. This tendency of the 
sign to transfer itself from one object to another is characteristic of 
human language. It is observable in the little child as soon as he begins 
to speak. Immediately and naturally he extends the meaning of the 
word he learns, availing himself of the most accidental connection or 
the most distant analogy to detach and transfer elsewhere the sign that 
had been associated in his hearing with a particular object. “Anything 
can designate anything;” such is the latent principle of infantine 
language. (Bergson, 1911/1968: 158) 
 
Bergson makes this observation about human language in the context of 
thinking about the intellect and human social life and in contrast to the social 
life and language of insects. Signs are central to Bergson’s understanding of 
community as a common social life (‘By language community of action is 
made possible’ (157)), but there are striking differences between a colony of 
ants and human society. Insects are dependent on instinct and the form of 
their organs. The number of signs in their language is very limited and each 
sign ‘must remain invariably attached to a certain object or a certain 
operation’ (158). For humans, there is no preordination of person to structure 
and no necessary attachment of sign to object or operation. It is the finiteness 
of the number of signs and also the ubiquity of their use that, according to 
Bergson, makes possible the ‘liberation’ of the intellect from the material 
object: ‘[t]he word, made to pass from one thing to another, is, in fact, by 
nature transferable and free. It can therefore be extended, not only from one 
perceived thing to another, but even from a perceived thing to a recollection of 
that thing, from the precise recollection to a more fleeting image, and finally 
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from an image fleeting, though still pictured, that is to say, to the idea’ (159). 
Thus, Bergson declares that ‘[t]he instinctive sign is adherent, the intelligent 
sign is mobile’ (158). That said, Bergson offers no further insight as to how a 
sign might be both intelligent and mobile. 
 
Nearly three quarters of a century later, Bruno Latour, in his Science in Action 
(1987), talks about the formation of new centres of calculation (of knowledge 
and authority) that embody what is commonly known as the Copernican 
revolution. He talks about how print technology makes possible the amassing 
of documents in one central place and their distribution to the peripheries. He 
refers to these documents – these things that make possible ‘a virtuous 
cumulative circle’ – as ‘immutable and combinable mobiles’ (1987: 227). For 
our purpose, John Law provides a useful and more provocative definition: 
[Latour] talks of objects such as vessels (though the description applies 
equally well to electronic messages passing round the globe, or 
travellers, or letters in the postal service) as immutable mobiles. 
Mobile, yes, because they move around, from Lisbon to Calicut, or New 
York to Sydney. And immutable because they hold their form, their 
structure. They hold together as a network. Here, then, the network-
ness of the metaphor works in two ways... The immutable mobiles are 
themselves a network, an array. They are objects. But they also pass 
down or through a network, held in an array of secure and stable 
surroundings as they move around. If the circuit is broken – if there is 
interference – then the packet, the array, the signal, the ship, the letter 
starts to degrade. It loses its form. It turns into something else. (Law, 
2000: 3) 
 
For Law immutable mobiles provide a way of understanding objects in the 
context of a field, or network, of relationality: ‘an object is an effect of an array 
of relations’ (1). Law, moreover, couches his argument in terms of 
understanding such relationality as both material and semiotic. He says in an 
earlier piece: ‘[A]ctor-network theory may be understood as a semiotics of 
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materiality. It takes the semiotic insight, that of the relationality of entities, 
the notion that they are produced in relations, and applies this ruthlessly to all 
materials – and not simply to those that are linguistic’ (Latour, 1999: 4). Such 
a conception of semiosis does not so much question a post-Saussurian 
understanding of the sign, but applies such a semiotics to different (i.e. not 
simply linguistic) domains: a sign is defined through its negativity and any 
movement (deferred or difference) is only in the context of the system. The 
ANT version of the object-sign (as immutable mobile) is able to move from A 
to B while maintaining its identity inasmuch as it is supported by a stable 
network. But if the identity of the object-sign is stable and the network is 
stable, and identity and movement are only understood through relationality, 
then we might wonder in what sense the object-sign is mobile at all. Zeno had 
a point here. 
 
In both these, and other, pieces Law and his colleagues have rightly stressed 
the need to move beyond a Cartesian conception of space (beyond the frame of 
mathematical geometry) and to think of topology, complexity, and fluidity. 
And yet Law, and co, make no attempt to question the fundamental 
conception of relationality and signification that they have inherited from 
Saussure. This gives rise to the question – one that is pertinent to Bergson as 
well – namely, can motility (not simply movement or mobility) be thought as 
internal to the concept of the sign? The question can be subdivided into: what 
is the relation between semiosis and materiality in the material-semiotic; and 
to what extent does an uneven distribution of agency across the two lead to an 
inability to conceive of the intelligent and/or mobile sign? In the remaining 
few minutes I will tentatively map out a very cursory response to this 
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question, one that is staged across a series of formulations about matter and 
solidarity, creative medium, and the notion of a living sign. 
 
 
Matter and Solidarity 
Of the three major models of semiotics and semiology of the 20th century 
(Saussurian – systemic, Voloshinovian – dialogic, Peircean – 
associative/pragmatic), material-semiotics (whether from Latour, Callon, and 
Law or from Haraway) draws on the resource of the post-Saussurian tradition. 
Again, Law is clear on this when he frames ANTs semiotics as a post-
structural advance on post-Saussurian linguistics (2000 and 2003). As is 
made perfectly clear in Derrida’s deconstruction of Saussure, a Saussurian 
conception of semiology is predicated on the notion of system and on the sign 
as a de-substantialised form. It is only because of these that signification can 
be produced through differentiation. Moreover, close to ANTs heart, Greimas’ 
understanding of narrative in terms of actantial functions rests on a notion of 
the actant as a structural, de-substantialised form; actantial structures are 
actualised within particular stories. 
 
And yet contra to the many explicit claims of ANT, any understanding of the 
contiguous and contingent mobilisation of complex and heterogeneous 
ontologies (i.e. as actor-networks) relies, I would argue, not on any application 
of a linguistic model of the sign, but on a fundamental rethinking of semiosis 
itself. Notably, translation must be understood not as representation (namely 
as the hierarchical substitution of one sign for another sign or thing), but as 
holding two or more things together in media res, such that there is an 
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association and reliance on one thing, or sign, and another, but such that the 
one neither controls nor subsumes the other (i.e. if I tread on a pin and 
consequently feel pain, then the pain I feel does not take the form of the pin or 
the wound; the one doesn’t dominate the other). Translation is in this sense 
about the relation of irreducibles; translation is an irreduction (cf. Latour, 
1988; Stengers, 2001). Translation, then, - inasmuch as it holds two or more 
singularities together, such that their relationality is in the first instance a 
multiplicity (i.e. a complex collectivity that has no single measure) - is in 
essence about substance and not simply form. Thus, contra Saussure, 
translation only works (whatever that might mean) because the sign is 
thoroughly substantialised. 
 
Of course, ANT, against some of its explicit claims, offers the possibility of 
thinking about semiosis, not on the basis of an a priori linguistic model – 
whether system or dialogue – but on the basis of association: namely, 
solidarity as mobilisation. In such a model, because of the explicit 
methodological confusion between sign and object in ANT and material-
semiotics generally, force relations are conceptualised as internal to the 
formation of sign relations. Crudely, signification and force are not external to 
one another. 
 
Creative Medium 
Donna Haraway considers how materiality and semiosis are always figured 
simultaneously as the ‘material-semiotic’ (1997 and 2000). But if the material-
semiotic is figured or shaped, it is not on the basis that either the material or 
the semiotic is active and the other is passive. For Haraway, matter is not 
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passive and inert; it is active, mobilising and meaning-generating. In her 
analyses of the cultural studies of science and technology, she doesn’t construe 
scientific knowledge as active and constructive and matter as that which is 
constituted within the cultural practices of science. For Haraway, the object of 
knowledge is also an actor. Haraway moves away from a logic of 
representation. Witnessing is never naked, always materially constructed, 
situated and articulated. Haraway deconstructs and situates the modest 
witness. The notion of the material-semiotic thus presents a problem with 
regard to some traditional understandings of epistemology and ontology. 
Instead of assuming that the subject of knowledge is an active subject and the 
object of knowledge is a passive entity waiting to be known, Haraway – in 
making matter an active matter – does not allow matter to just sit there under 
the microscope, as it were. In Haraway’s account the microbe, the cell 
structure, the metal and so on, jump back and catch the observer within a 
more complex kind of ‘cat’s cradle’ (to use one of Haraway’s metaphors). In 
this sense, epistemology and ontology are intimately related and often blur. 
And this is nowhere more apparent than in relation to the kind of organic-
technological hybrids that Haraway investigates. Cyborg bio-technological 
fusions deliver entities that make us question our often taken-for-granted 
categories and divisions between the human and non-human or the organic 
and machine. In typically hyperbolic rhetoric, Haraway declares: ‘The 
biological body – and its mirror twin, the informational body – is the 
wormhole through which explorers will be hurtled into unexplored territories 
in the New World Order.’ (1997: 117) 
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Biology - as the cutting edge of contemporary technoscience – is, as 
cyberfeminist Sarah Kember has argued, ‘the hegemonic discourse of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ (2003: 178). As another 
commentator on Haraway’s work has stated: ‘[b]iology, woven in and through 
information technologies and systems, along with information technology, is 
one of the great “representing machines” of the late twentieth century’ (cf. 
Goodeve, 2000: 26). In this sense, ‘new media technologies’ refer to the way 
in which new genetic technoscience construes the body as ‘coded’ and 
‘codeable’. Not film nor television nor literature, but ‘life itself’ is the leading-
edge representing machine of contemporary society. What was the ‘content’ of 
earlier representing machines, such as film, print and television, has now 
become a medium itself. Biology now represents and carries representations. 
Biology is understood, not just as knowledge, but as code and codeable bodies:  
DNA is seen as the quintessential late modern medium of communication. 
Haraway says: ‘[t]he genome is a historically specific collective construct, built 
by and from humans and nonhumans. To be “made” is not to be “made up”... 
The reality and materiality of the genome is simultaneously semiotic, 
institutional, machinic, organic, and biotechnical’ (1997: 99).  
 
Such analytic descriptions of the high-tech world of bio-science also can come 
to bear  analytically on more mundane social worlds. At stake is an 
understanding of different mediums through which ‘codification’ and 
‘communication’ occurs, but also an understanding that the mediums are 
themselves media: namely, the medium of communication is itself agentic and 
creative. In this sense, if there is no clear alignment across agents as media, 
then the channel is not of communication, but noise. As Serres makes clear, 
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noise, multiplicity, and genesis have a particular affinity (Serres, 1996). If the 
material-semiotic, then, neither subjugates the material to the semiotic (as in 
forms of social constructionist) nor the semiotic to the material (as in forms of 
realism), then questions arise as to the precise nature of the relation between 
semiosis and materiality, or to put it another way, what’s the status of the 
hyphen? On the one hand, if the material-semiotic designates an equivalence 
between sign and object, then are both seen to have agency? If so, can we ever 
witness these agencies as divergent or disjunctive, i.e. sign agency 
independent of object agency, such that some materialities don’t have 
signification (a-signifying semiotics, such as phonemes) ? On the other hand, 
if both sign and object don’t have distinct agentic powers, then what’s the 
relation between them? Is the relation one of form and substance, such that 
the sign constitutes the form of matter? If so, then we return to some of the 
classic problems that we see in Saussure and others that ANT and Haraway 
appear to be moving away from. I should note here that I talk of objects as 
shorthand for varying types of materiality, not simply that which takes the 
form of an ‘object’ as such. 
 
Concluding Thoughts on Generation 
To talk of signs as motile – conceived within the substantial relationality of 
mobilisation and translation, rather than system, community of sign users,  or 
face-to-face speech – is to suggest an analogy, at least, between the sign and a 
form of life: namely, to conceive of the sign as vital, not in the sense of it being 
a sign of life, such that the sign is necessarily constituted as the death of soma 
(cf. Kristeva), but as a living sign, such that semiosis is conceived as a part of 
life (cf. Canguilhem, Foucault). It is Aristotle who most notably talks about life 
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in terms of motive principle. Bodies that move on their own accord are 
referred to as souls. Are signs soul-like? 
 
ANT doesn’t venture into discussion about vitalism, but there may be some 
mileage in reading the one through the other. Unlike Aristotle who conceives 
of the soul as the  form of matter, and as the organisation of the organs, ANT 
starts in reverse. A primordial world of action and part-objects become 
ordered and organised through association and translation: namely, any series 
of parts do not become organised until after mobilisation, not before. 
Nevertheless, in Aristotelian terms this organisation – the resultant of 
mobilisation – can be seen in terms of the informing of matter or its 
actualisation through form. If sign-objects are in the first instance motile, then 
the mobilisation of these ‘actors’ into a ‘network’ implies not simply 
actualisation of inert matter into form, but the actualisation of similarly 
agentic being. We might properly refer to this as generation, to the generation 
of social life, to semiotic life by virtue of its collectivity. 
